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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING
INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION
HowardJ. Taubenfeld*
Rita Falk Taubenfeld**
In all human organizations, there is a constitution, a charter,
either implicit or explicit, written or unwritten, which defines the
guidelines and parameters for choosing the working "rules of the
game." In any political entity, the constitution also sets limits beyond which the rulers may not go. An inquiry into the implicit,
largely unwritten international constitution requires looking at,
but also beyond, the public actions and claims of states at any moment. The content of such an unwritten constitution is perforce
open to debate, especially at the international level where, in contrast with those of a state, all the political institutions remain relatively primitive. Nevertheless, by observation of state conduct one
can deduce a basic set of decisionmaking rules of the game at the
international level.
If the international constitution is to be a useful concept with
operational value, rather than an empty deduction from a priori assumptions, it must be possible to identify some specific operational
content. One evidence that such content exists is the fact that international law exists. Since by definition there is a complex of
rules for the creation and existence of international law, and because these "constitutional" rules can be viewed as genuine constraints on the legitimate conduct of the nations, we need not be
trapped into the infinite regression of choice to note that rules for
rulemaking exist at the international level. As in all societies, the
need for binding rules is based not on some prior legal rule, but on
the shared need for survival, preferably with decency, dignity, and
some hope for a share of the amenities which civilization offers,
coupled with the desire for peace. We can also note that as with
other constitutions, these rules for defining the rules have evolved
and can be expected to continue to do so. Both the Nuremberg
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. A.B., 1947;
LL.B., 1948; Ph.D., 1958, Columbia University.
** Senior Research Associate, Southern Methodist University School of Law at
the time of the preparation of this Article in its initial form. A.B., 1946, N.Y.U.; M.A.,
1959; Ph.D., 1969, University of California at Berkeley.
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trials and the growing recognition by the international legal community that basic human rights are entitled to protection, even
against the will of the sovereign, are watersheds which attest to the
fact of this ongoing evolution.
The notion of an unwritten constitution is not at all new. The
unwritten British constitution not only defines how the rules are to
be made and what the rules are at any given time, but also, in the
repeated statements of jurists and statesmen, contains within it the
concept of basic rights, the inalienable rights of an Englishman
which no group in power-Crown, Parliament, courts, or all together-can legally transgress. That constitution sets limits on permissible group actions, somehow defined and implemented. Thus,
even if undertaken via legitimate decisional processes, at least
some government actions would be viewed by British courts as inconsistent with the British constitution, that is, as inconsistent with
the basic rights of the British people.
Insofar as the notion of fundamental human rights is tenable at
all, it offers similar evidence that the content of the underlying,
partly unwritten international constitution is evolving. Thus, the
acts constituting genocide could be viewed both as illegal in present international law and as a crime against humanity even before
the phrase was coined and before a set of treaties or state practice
so characterized them. Why? How? Genocidal acts turn out to
have been barred by the unwritten international constitution, by
an international consensus that there exists at some level a basic
right: The right of different groups of mankind not to be wantonly
exterminated.

As with all areas of international law, the present content of
human rights law can be extracted from the regularities of positive
international law. In this case, we seek certain regularities even
now: those which deal with vested rights and the hierarchy and
trade-offs between them, the rules of the game of decisionmaking
in society, and the basic limits on the institutions of social choice.
These forbidden incursions include the basic constitutional limits
on permissible group actions and some limits on the wider level of
government. Thus, freedom from interference in domestic jurisdictions is, absent exigent circumstances, an understood right of
states.
In all systems, constitutional constraints on impermissible
group action tend to conflict and compete. Different constitutional
systems have different de facto social tie-breakers in such cases and
different enforcement systems for protecting legitimate social
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choice. The international legal system faces the same dilemmas but
remains partial, limited, and primitive. For example, in the conflict
between human rights and a sovereign's immunity from external
interference, multiple standards and uncertain enforcement are
common and to be expected. Different standards of performance
are expected from states at different levels of economic and political development. Even so, some international constitutional limitations on state action can be defined even now. This Article therefore explores the notion of a largely unwritten international
constitution and some of the features it now embodies. In part, this
is accomplished by use of a case study of some human rights issues
which have gone through a period of increasing scrutiny and articulation since World War II. Within the area of human rights we
concentrate our attention on the class of crimes against humanity
-those actions most clearly parallel to gross deprivatory actions of
a kind proscribed by all national constitutions. Within that framework, we focus particularly, as one example, on that form of discrimination called apartheid.
Background
While the concept of the international protection of human
rights was not unknown in 1945,1 the United Nations Charter,

1. There are the familiar cases of prisoners, civilians wounded and sick in war,
and of aliens under special circumstances. On the other hand, the more common approach was that of the British government which, when asked in 1938 to intervene
on behalf of the German Jews, reportedly indicated that it considered such an intervention both improper and illegal under international law. For a discussion of the
pre-1945 period, see the summary in R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, RACE,
PEACE, LAW, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 37-39 (1968). For an overview with documeits,
see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1-5, 137-95, 213-369 (1973). For problem-oriented consideration of the issues with
which this Article is concerned, see R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979).

An unusual and interesting early case of a process of forcing the development of
a significant type of "human rights" which, at least initially, was unequally favored
by, and unequally convenient for, the nations involved, is found in the experience
surrounding the eradication of the slave trade in the nineteenth century. There a few
major sea powers, primarily Great Britain, undertook to enforce their laws against the
trade on the high seas, based on their own values, opportunities, and trade-offs, regardless of the national origin of the intercepted ship. E. KLINGBERG, THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND 135 (1953). In time, the ban on slave-trading became internationally accepted. This occurred by the 1870's, after the American Civil
War, H. TEMPERLEY, BRITISH ANTISLAVERY 1833-1870 257 (1972), although the

United States Supreme Court had previously held that there was no such international rule. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 30, 53 (1825). This, in turn suggests
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without giving explicit content to a human bill of rights, expressly
reaffirmed mankind's "faith in fundamental human rights, in the

dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women."2 This marks a turning point in the political and legal

pursuit of humane treatment for humanity. 3 Moreover, Charter articles call expressly for the United Nations (U.N.) to promote uni-

versal "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 4
Members are legally obliged to act to achieve these purposes. 5
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that much of the U.N.'s subsequent

work in the field of human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,6 and the many subsequent human
rights resolutions and even the conventions, 7 has been primar-

ily definitional: to give more specified content to the obligations
some transition-period problems with this type of informal, non-multilateral human
rights creation process.
2. U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
3. The peace treaties following the First World War did provide for some instances of human rights protection. For example, an individual could bring certain
claims even against "his" government before an arbitral tribunal. See P. DE
AZcAVATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 164-68 (1945); G.
KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA 45-54 (1942).
The concept of an international interest in dependent peoples was formalized in the
League of Nations' mandates system. See J. GREEN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS 648-53 (1956). The mandates system, established by Article 22 of the
League of Nations Covenant, was a plan to supervise and administer the German

and Ottoman colonies (the "mandated territories") with special attention given to
safeguarding the rights of the inhabitants. Provision was made for the receipt and examination by the Council of the League of Petitions from individuals and organizations regarding the territories. This right of an individual or of a group to petition an
international organization was a "notable departure from the traditional idea that relations between national states are the sole concern of international law." Id. at 651.
The United Nations Charter generalized these rights to apply to all peoples. U.N.
CHARTER art. II, para. 6.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
5. Id. art. II, para. 5:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article I, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in M. CRANSTON,
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 87 (1973).
7. See, e.g., The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N.
Doe. A/6014 (1965).
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members assume vis-a-vis their own populations in accepting the
Charter. 8
The inherent conflict between a state's right to control its internal affairs and its obligations to the world community to assure
at least a range of minimal human rights and freedoms to its peoples is obviously not entirely new, nor different in principle from
other such conflicts between valued social principles or goals; nor,
indeed, is it confined to the international level of government. 9
8. This principle was recognized in the early days of the United Nations. For
instance, Judge Spiropoulas, a representative from Greece, commented: "[als the obligation to respect human rights was placed upon Member States by the Charter, it
followed that any violation of human rights was a violation of the provisions of the
Charter." 3(1) U.N. GAOR, C. 6 (138th mtg.) 765 (1948); see P. JESSup, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1947); 20 U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (1347th mtg.) 336-37, 340-41, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1347 (1965) (comments of delegates from Trinidad and Tobago and
New Zealand).
9. On this conflict of valid but competitive Charter obligations and of valued
international goals and norms, Oscar Schachter has said:
[Blecause principles are general and fundamental, they tend to clash
with each other in specific cases-thus every principle in the Charter can be
paired off with a contrary or opposing principle in the context of a particular
situation .... Even the salient rule against force is "balanced by" the right
of self-defence and collective enforcement measures and the most fervent
supporters of the principle of self-determination have recognized the
opposing claims of the obligation of peaceful settlement and the principle of
"territorial integrity." This characteristic opposition of principles is not, as
some have suggested, the result of political confusion or defective drafting;
on the contrary, it is a desirable and necessary way of expressing the diverse and competing aims and interests of mankind. An attempt to eliminate
such inconsistencies can only result in an artificial emphasis on some abstractions and a suppression of valid and basic human values.
Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politicsand Action in the United Nations, I RECUEIL
DE COURS 191 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), reprinted in part in 3
THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 94, 114 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1966). See

also Schachter, Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 3-5 (1962) (Dag Hammarskjold recognized that principle of observance of
human rights was always to be balanced by concept of nonintervention. Where principles of human rights and nonintervention both cannot be fully satisfied, some compromise, some trade-off between these valued goals, is clearly unavoidable). The
definition of the optimal compromise for any social group as always depends on
which or whose tastes and values are being used to define the group's objectives; for
example, the King's, the Dictator's, the President's, the Congress', or the majority's,
the minority's, or those of some complex mixture thereof? For U.N. discussions of
these issues, see R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 31-79. There
are interesting materials on many of these matters in InternationalProtection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The Subcommittee, in its report, argued that
protection for human rights of the type discussed in this Article already exists in in-
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Not only are direct parallels relevant to any federal system, but
even within an essentially unitary governmental structure practicing majority-rule decisionmaking, the potential conflict between
the civil and other basic, constitutionally protected rights of the individual (and the various minorities) and the definitive decisionmaking rights of the sovereign majority parallels the potential conflict at the international level between the basic human rights of individuals and subgroups and the rights of a sovereign nation to be
free of intervention in its domestic affairs. Indeed, the typical objective of "enshrining" a formal bill of rights, including specific
constitutional protections for individuals in such a society, is an attempt to protect potentially threatened individuals and groups
against the authoritative decisions of the legitimate government. At
the very least the aim is to prevent that government from taking
the specified types of actions labeled "unconstitutional" which
would otherwise allow the majority, by entirely appropriate decisional rules and processes, to do great and even irreparable harm
to the protected individuals and minorities.' 0
Analysts keep returning to the question of how to assure that
the specified rights of individuals are in fact to be defended
operationally, with maximum safety for all sections of society,
against the potentially unacceptable depredatory acts of government acting within its normal spheres of authority. Which organ of
"government" is to be allotted "final say" or "ultimate sovereignty"
on constitutional issues? Who can correct that body if its decisions
threaten human rights or social survival? If the international system
is to develop institutions that can correct the "final" acts of governments, who will oversee these international institutions? The intrinsic nature of such ultimate political dilemmas-and the consequent inherent risks and imperfections of all group political-choice
processes---cannot be escaped and therefore should be explored
creatively. Then, given the intrinsically imperfect limited possibilities and the overall group's constitutional bargain on values, norms,

ternational law.

HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ORGS. AND MOVEMENTS, HUMAN
PIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, H.R. Doc. No.

382-11, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].

10.

In some few cases, most notably in the United States, these constitutional

guarantees have been primarily interpreted and defended through the court system.
Such judicial review, which asserts the primacy of the courts on issues of constitutionality and, hence of most human rights, over acts of the legislatures, is obviously
not without its special merits and problems. It has not been a popular procedure
elsewhere.
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and decision processes, the social constitutional design and those
who interpret it under fire can be expected to minimize at least
the major risks to all individuals, minority and majority.
It seems obvious that renewed attention to the logical and real
dilemmas for individualistic traditions inherent in all coercive
group-decision processes, that is, all government, will reinforce
logically the traditional conceptual constitutional strategy of "individualism" which has regularly called for minimizing the sphere of
government consistent with the achievement of other equally
highly valued individual and social aims. This does not, obviously,
eliminate debate in each case on the appropriate mix of risks and
trade-offs. Unfortunately, no automatic system of clear-cut constitutional justice is at hand, or, indeed, even feasible in principle.
Constitutional justice has to be defined in each case by human institutions, however imperfect. This ultimately is the bitter implication of all our famous human rights-constitutional dilemmas. There
are no cookbooks. Humanity is left with the unavoidable responsibility to decide for itself, with dignity.
The short legislative history of these matters at the international level is revealing. The partial letdown of the post-Nuremberg
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)" epoch ended in
the 1960's with the General Assembly's adoption of the Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963),12
its promulgation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965),1 3 and, after
nearly two decades of frustrating negotiations, the General Assembly's adoption and opening for signature of an International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' 4 with an Optional Protocol
11. Eleanor Roosevelt, then the Representative of the United States, held the
formal position that: "The draft declaration was not a treaty or international agreement and did not impose legal obligations; it was rather a statement of basic principles of inalienable human rights, setting up a common standard of achievement for
all people and nations." 3(1) U.N. GAOR, C. 3 (89th mtg.) 32 (1948). While such
statements are occasionally repeated today, see, e.g., the comment by State Department spokesman, Mr. Popper, in Hearings, supra note 9, at 503, the Declaration has

taken on a life of its own; in 1968, the International Conference on Human Rights at
Tehran stated unanimously that the Declaration "constitutes an obligation for the
members of the international community." Proclamation of Tehran, Final Act of the
International Conference on Human Rights 4, U.N. Doc. AJConf. 32/41 (1968).
12. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
13. 660 U.N.T.S. 195; G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 650 (1966) (opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
14. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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permitting individual complaints in some cases to a Human Rights

Committee, 15 and an International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.16
In addition, over the years, the U.N. has been moving in many
other ways involving human rights, whether or not traditionally so

labeled. First, several specific limited human rights agreements
have been promulgated covering such areas as genocide, 17 racial

discrimination,18 women, 19 and slavery. 20 There have also been innumerable resolutions and declarations on these subjects. 21 Many
of these agreements are in force, but typically for the relatively few

major powers. Second, a large number of specific human rights
22
matters have been debated in the political organs of the U.N.

More striking, the entire effort of the Organization in the field of
decolonialization and self-determination can also be viewed as at
15. Id. at 59.
16. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966); see INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 12TH HAMMARSKJOLD
FORUM 9-13 (J. Carey ed. 1968); Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights:
Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 171; McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in
the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 630 (1964).
Under these treaties, each country retains major power of interpretation and implementation of the agreed general norms. Furthermore the treaties are not selfenforcing, so that the ultimately effective final say in human rights matters would remain with the states.
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
18. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47,
U.N. Doe. AJ6014 (1965). For a discussion of the racial-discrimination treaty, see
Bitker, The International Treaty Against Racial Discrimination, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
68 (1970); Newman, The New International Tribunal on Racial Discrimination, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 1559 (1968).

19. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 309 U.N.T.S. 67; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on Consent
to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 193 U.N.T.S.
135.
20. International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery, adopted
Sept. 25, 1926, 60 U.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927); Protocol Amending
the Slavery Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1953, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered
into force Dec. 7, 1953).
21. See, e.g., authorities cited notes 25-29 infra.
22. For example, when the Soviet government prohibited Soviet women married to foreign subjects from leaving Russia in the 1940's, this action was deplored
by the Economic and Social Council in a Resolution in 1948. R. TAUBENFELD & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 50. It has been argued that the increase of human
rights activity in the U.N. is part of a "slow process of constitutional growth in the
relationship between the individual and the organized international community....
Id. at 51.
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least one broad facet of the U.N.'s approach to human rights, an
effort generally pursued with success politically and militarily and
with at least psychological and moral support from the U.N., despite persistent claims of domestic jurisdiction on the part of the
colonial suzerains involved. 23 Thus, with moral support and other
assistance from the U.N. and, in varying ways, from its most powerful members, millions of formerly dependent peoples have
achieved the effective right to have indigenous nationals take over
their own government. In practice of course, this has meant that
indigenous groups of decisionmakers attained the power to run and
to modify the inherited constitutions and the inherited ongoing
political-distributive institutions of their own societies, whereas
these had formerly been controlled by members of the colonial suzerain's decisionmaking groups and/or their clients and allies
among the native populations, presumably in their own selfinterests.
Typically, no specific enforceable human rights constraints
have been imposed on these post-colonial indigenous governments
vis-a-vis their own peoples as they have taken up this important
constitutional and political restructuring, despite the obvious and
inevitable intergroup conflicts in these emerging polities of often
historically arbitrary geography and varied cultures. We know that
some major human rights disasters have been a predictable result,
and others may well be expected, as the dominating groups try to
fashion and inculcate a national culture and attempt to both create
and retain control over a national political-economic constitutional
system. Typically, the new states themselves in their turn have
routinely asserted "domestic jurisdiction" defenses when they have
subsequently been challenged on human rights issues in the
U.N. 24 In sum, the jury is still out on the overall net benefit to human rights of a practice of decolonialization without an effective set
of human rights obligations placed on the whole new set of sovereigns. Hopefully, in the long run, the net effect of the no doubt

23.

See id. at 45-48.

24.

Calls for nonintervention and noninterference in domestic matters are the

norm but are often made by states which call for direct intervention in nonfavored
states. Upper Volta, as one example, has said that its foreign policy is based on the
concept of independence of states, while noting, in the same statement, that it supports "the freedom-fighters" in all of southern Africa. U.N. Press Release WS/261,
Sept. 30, 1966, at 16. On the continuing problems of human rights in many countries
of Africa, see BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN

AFRICA (Current Policy No. 119, Jan. 1980).
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excessively pragmatic decolonization processes will be positive in

terms of achieved human liberty.
Approaches to human rights at the U.N. have also included,

for example, the adoption of resolutions on the elimination of racial
discrimination, 2 5 urging states to ratify the International Conven-

tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and
resolutions urging states to adopt the Covenants on Human
Rights.2 6 States have also been urged to protect human rights in
the administration of justice 2 7 and in armed conflicts. 28 At the
same time, it has been primarily due to the widespread, highly traditional jealousy of their power on the part of the sovereigns, new

and old, that the General Assembly has not been able to agree to
29
create the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights.
We appear to be currently in a transition period regarding human rights. It is widely acknowledged that some protection in favor

of individuals and groups against deliberate, extreme, damaging
behavior on the part of states with power over them is necessary,
and that some very general legal limitations on the freedom of
states to encroach on an individual's human rights do already exist.
25. G.A. Res. 2016A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014
(1965).
26. G.A. Res. 3142, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 84, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
27. G.A. Res. 3144, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 85, U.N. Doe. A19030 (1973).
28. G.A. Res. 3102, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 141, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 78-79, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 3075, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 35) 14-15, U.N. Doe. A/9030
(1973).
29. See G.A. Res. 3136, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 80, U.N. Doe. A19030
(1973); [1973] U.N.Y.B. 564-66. In the Human Rights Committee, the United States
has favored resolutions which would create the post immediately. These resolutions
have not carried. As U.S. Representative, William F. Buckley, Jr., once expressed the
disappointment of the United States:
[Tihe arguments of those opposed to the creation of High Commissioner
appeared to center on the concern that said High Commissioner would interfere in the internal affairs of their countries. Our understanding was that
suitable precautions against such interferences, in violation of the U.N.
Charter, were built into the pending proposal.
On the other hand, we cannot deny that there is a sense in which the
mere espousal of human rights in an international organization is to interfere
philosophically with the internal affairs of some countries. Human rights is
an ideal to which we all pay lip service. Even the best-intentioned among
us serve that ideal asymptotically; in some societies, with such studied
unsuccess as to call into question whether we can really call human rights a
shared ideal.
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. POSITIONS STATED AT
28TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 15 (Mar. 1, 1974). There is still no High Commis-

sioner despite further pressure by the United States and some other nations.
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In fact, many of the general norms continue to be honored only in
the breach by many states. Yet even though they remain uncongenial for sovereign states to absorb, such limitations now appear
in many instances desirable even from the states' point of view for
the maintenance of peace and security, or, in other words, for
widely desired systemic stability in the current international system. Historically, intolerably offensive treatment of groups of resident individuals by states has tended to lead to international tension and even to outright conflict, particularly when other powerful
states have population elements that are descendants or relatives
or allies of a threatened group. Indeed, viewed from the vantage
point of an emerging indirect governmental system, this element of
political pluralism in the international system appears potentially
healthy. In a functioning democracy, such complexity of interests
of the actors is generally viewed as a major political source of widespread support for the control of extreme solutions.
Thus it is understandable that these general declaratory human rights norms, and calls for their specification, have been so
widely joined in or acquiesced in despite the conceptual problems
and realistic enforcement obstacles of the present international system. Nevertheless, widespread voluntary submission by states to
the more explicitly defined but still very early and inchoate proposed regime of general human rights law, as exemplified in the
Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Bights, 30 noted earlier, has so far not been extended by the great
majority of states. The Covenants have not been widely and rapidly
ratified.
The significance of this for the legal status and effective
enforceability of human rights in this transition period in this essentially voluntaristic legal system does eventually have to be considered realistically. But if, as with the slow, evolutionary development of earlier norms, such as those barring slavery, we have to
patiently expect long lags, we can also expect that these will often
be followed by discrete jumps in explicitness of norms and in state
conduct in conformity thereto. 3 1
30. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
31. For example, such a leap was taken at the Nuremberg Trials. Although in
hindsight it can be shown that the delicts in question, the crimes against humanity,
as well as the crimes against the person, had been slowly evolving, the "conscience"
of mankind was also invoked. Surely at the international level, this is the counterpart
to "public policy" arguments on the national, constitutional level. Further, the con-
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In sum, while the record is far from clear-cut, there has been
a definite overall movement towards the position that the defense
of at least some human rights, even against one's own legitimate
government, at some times and places, is clearly a matter of general international concern and an appropriate sphere for international action.3 2 Quite predictably, once independent, the new
states have joined the older guard, and all vociferously defend their
own "domestic jurisdiction" when challenged on human rights issues. Nevertheless, on balance, the sphere of international interest
in human rights issues has been slowly growing, and it appears that
domestic jurisdiction
the effective scope of the claim of exclusive
33
markedly.
but
slowly
has been shrinking
This evolution is perhaps less politically inexplicable even for a
community of sovereigns than one might have supposed. It is by
now a commonplace notion that all political systems must expect
vincing nature of these two strong strands of arguments in many legal traditions predates the trials at Nuremberg, which thus can be viewed as a discrete jump in implementation of the law, to catch up with its already evolved content. In any case, at the
very least the trials attest to the willingness of some states to set up multinational tribunals to sit in judgment on the officials of other states who were believed to have
been gravely delinquent on human rights issues, even vis-a-vis subgroups of their
own populations.
32. Henkin, The United Nations and Human Rights, 19 INT'L OnG. 504, 506
(1965); see Bilder, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Short-Term Prospects, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1974); Humphrey, The InternationalBill of Rights: Scope and
Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY'L. REv. 527 (1976); McDougal & Bebr, supra note
16; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919 (1975); Reisman,
Responses to Crimes of Discriminationand Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29
(1971). For an illuminating discussion of present and future possibilities, see American Society of International Law, The United Nations and Race: Will the United Nations Law Affect Victims of Racial Discrimination and Oppressors?, 64 PRoc. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 106-30 (1970).
33. Traditionally in the international system most states, large and small, have
consistently pressed as primary, if not inviolable, the rights and perquisites of sovereignty. These have regularly tended to be viewed as superior to all other claims on a
state. Generally, similar claims of other states have tended to be, likewise, given
weight by their peer states. That by the end of World War II this had begun to be
somewhat less consistently and overwhelmingly supported does, therefore, appear to
mark a significant change in the tastes of the sovereigns for human rights, an increased willingness at least to acquiesce in some modestly reduced freedoms for
other fellow sovereigns when serious international political conflicts are potentially
involved, in a nuclear era. With it all, this appears to be part of a significant evolutionary process towards the development of a more effectively enforceable set of international human rights: if handled carefully, no doubt one of the potentially
healthier nuclear fallouts.
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frequently to have to force a choice between conflicting group objectives, and that typically these are espoused primarily by differing component population subgroups, presumably in reflection
of their own visions of their varying self-interests at the time. Such
is the case in practice with the conflict between national selfdefense, as envisaged by the dominating internal coalition in a nation, and the human rights, at least the right of survival, of its minorities. Realistically, the tastes and interests of the dominating
coalition within a society at any time can be expected to largely determine the eventual trade-offs effectuated. Threads of evidence
suggest that the tastes of the various dominating coalitions in the
states which have the potential power to form a dominating international coalition have been slowly changing in favor of the development of a more effective multinational protection of minimal human rights (perhaps regionalized when possible as in Europe with
its Commission and Court of Human Rights), at least when potential threats to the peace are involved in this era when many countries have, or can readily develop, nuclear weapons.
It is also increasingly obvious that legal systems tend to grow
discontinuously, in spurts and in lead sectors. Thus it is not unreasonable to expect that increasingly the U.N. will consider exploring, passing judgment on, and, perhaps in time, effectively acting
in at least some classes of human rights depredations in addition to
those (primarily negative anticolonial issues) it has considered in
the past. This is obviously most likely in those cases for which the
"political will" to intervene effectively exists or can be forged at
that time in the international arena. What kinds of issues are these
likely to be? For reasons to be explicated below, it seems likely
that certain racial issues will be one such important subset. In particular apartheid of the South African variety is likely to be a significant "lead sector" in the evolving law of human rights.
AN EXAMPLE: SouTH AFBIA'S APARTHiD
AS AN OFFENSE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS

While consideration of the development of general human
rights and of specific international human rights legislation has
ebbed and flowed at the U.N., the situation in southern Africa has
been an increasingly persistent issue in the General Assembly for
30 years. 3 4 We do not here consider the particular "colonial" or
34.

For discussions on apartheid in South Africa, see G. CARTER, SOUTHERN
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colonial-offshoot-type questions of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the former
Portuguese colonies, South West Africa-Namibia 35 with its special
history and prospects, or the broader human rights issues in the
Republic of South Africa itself. We focus briefly instead on the development and current status of that nearly universally condemned
concept, apartheid, which, as the South Africans themselves suggest, 36 is a nonintegration policy imposing "separate" development
of peoples of different races within an imposed partition of the society. This policy complex, it is claimed, has emerged as a special
case in the hierarchy of internationally opposed and highly offensive human rights delinquencies.
Apartheid Defined
If we are to consider the evidence as to whether apartheid is
currently illegal in international law-a crime against humanity-it
remains necessary to seek out the elements of a legally defensible
case for such a judgment. Presumably, "workable" law can be expected to achieve the traditional objectives of providing clear-cut
definition, reasonably predictable identification of, and warning
against, perpetuating antisocial actions. With reliable punishment
aided by a credible enforcement system, it can serve as a deterrent
to predictably illegal activities, rendering such actions likely to be
subjected to sanctions.
First, we should remember that two polar concepts of the nature of apartheid and its implications exist-that held, at least until
very recently, by white South Africa, 37 and that held by the African states and many of the black South Africans and shared more
or less closely by most other nations. To most nations, apartheid is
a policy of comprehensive repression and exploitation of a majority
racial group by a dominating racial minority. In historic fact, the
use of the concept has been primarily limited by all parties to cases
of white minorities repressing and exploiting non-whites in Africa,
though this certainly need not be the case in principle.
In the Republic of South Africa, the most prosperous and
AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE (For. Pol. Assoc., Headline Series, No. 219, Feb.
1974); R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 23-31, 117-25;
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 32, at 994-1034.
35. For a recent summary of developments, and a brief review of developments
in Namibia post-1945, see BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
NAMIBIA: REVIEW OF NEGOTIATIONS (Current Policy No. 222, Sept. 1980).
36. C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, SOUTH AFRICA 6 (1964).
37. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/8

14

Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld: Human Rights and the Emerging International Constitution
1981]

EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION

technologically advanced sovereign state on the African continent,
apartheid, in fact, succeeded baaskaap or was the later form
baaskaap took, for various political reasons. This occurred when
white South Africans of Dutch descent felt the need to organize
their society for the long-run self-defense of their privileged status
in a hostile continent and in a country in which they are a small
but dominating minority. Thus, it was the continuation of an outright, forthright, and relatively unlimited assertion of a permanent
domination by the white minority over the total population and the
total resource base. The South African government defends apartheid as a humanitarian policy step allowing each to develop its
special future. 38 In that government's view, this policy includes
cultural and political "self-determination" and "self-government" of
each major racial group within its separate enclave. In fact, however, the right of each group to self-determination is highly limited. It does not include the right to choose not to be separate, nor
the right to choose the size and location of the separate enclave,
nor the right to a fair partition among the groups. Native enclaves,
Bantustans, geographically chosen by the central government, are
scattered throughout South Africa. It is reported that they have
consistently been apportioned the least desirable real estate in each
locale. 39 There is evidence that they cannot be the basis for a contiguous, economically self-sustaining state. They comprise about
thirteen percent of the land to be divided among seventy percent
of the peoples. 40 They include no major port, major city, or major
resources. 4 ' When a valuable resource has turned up in one of the
apportioned Bantustans, that area has reportedly been extracted
from the Bantustan.4 2 They are clearly designed to be permanently
38. Racial classifications are set by the government: White (some 4 million),
Bantu (Blacks, over 15 million), Coloureds (mulattoes, 2 million), and Asian (0.6 million). H. ADAM, MODERNIZING RACIAL DOMINATION 3 (1971); Mowle, The Infringement of Human Rights in Nations of Southern Africa, Hearings, supra note 9, at
946, 949. There is some evidence that classifications in the past have been varied for
the convenience of the government; while Chinese were declared "non-white," Japanese, whose trade partnership was valued, were reported at one time to be called
"honorary whites." See Lancaster, South Africa's Apartheid, Wall St. J.,July 13,
1966, at 14, col. 4-5.
39. C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, supra note 36, at 148.
40.

C. HILL, BANTUSTANS 25-26 (1964); Bantustan Policy: A Fraud and a Fan-

tasy, 26 U.N. Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, at 2, U.N. Doc. AJAC. 1151L.286 (1971).
41. See C. LEGtNI & M. LEGLUM, supra note 36, at 58.

42. See G. CARTER, supra note 34, at 40-45; C. HILL, supra note 40, at 20-42;
Bantustan Policy: A Fraud and a Fantasy, 26 U.N. Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, U.N.
Doc. AIAC.115/L.286 (1971).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 475

economically dependent fragments, poor and dispersed. They are
expected and designed to provide pools of cheap, unskilled, black
As the political situation changes and the white South Africans feel more threatened by events outside their borders, and as the Bantustans develop stronger black
leaders, it can be expected that some renegotiation of the unfair partition of South
Africa between white and non-white regions will be effectuated, as appears to be
taking place in the Transkei. Since in bargaining, the initial position is crucial and
defines the overall "bargaining range," one cannot expect sufficient modifications to
arrive at a "fair" partition to come from negotiations which start on the basis of the
current Bantustans as a serious alternative capable of being made acceptable with essentially minor modifications.
The South African Government, of course, insists that the proposed partitions
are fair. As noted, we have discussed one reasonable, not technically unspecifiable
basis for a "fair shares" division of South Africa. R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 117-25. While challenging evaluations would have to be
made, they are in principle quite easy to determine. And in practice, a set of strategic, geographic, economic, political, and other scientific technicians could be found
to help define and apply the best currently developed geographic-resource and property-evaluation techniques available to arrive at a politically, economically, and militarily defensible set of fair-partition packages, any one of which would assure some
sort of fair division of assets and resources between the groups.
Note that there are likely to be many different specific alternative fair partitions
that could fill the terms of our suggested criteria. It can be expected that the precise
fair option selected will, to a considerable extent, determine and/or be determined
by the subsequent feasible set of intra-group economic and political power relations
in the deprived post-partition societies. Incidentally, it therefore also can be expected to affect relations between the post-partition societies. For some early modem explorations of what has subsequently turned out to be a major set of politicaleconomic problems for both prediction or evaluation in all the social sciences, see J.
GRAAFF, THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS (1957); Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare
Propositionsin Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941-1942).
The social optimum cannot normally be determined by technicians on the basis
of so general a distributive rule. Enormous interpersonal distributive indeterminates
normally remain implicit in such general fair distributive social norms as "one person, one share." Even if this norm could be agreed upon in international negotiations, and it was agreed that it should be operationalized by technicians, enormous
unresolved political-choice issues would remain for political resolution.
This all adds up to complex political negotiations and bargaining that are unavoidable both within the subdividing subgroups and between them in the processes
of hammering out a choice of a unique, actual, internally and internationally fair partition. If the negotiations are well run, the outcome will come from the "optimal
set," i.e., it will be one of the outcomes believed consistent with the norms: "One
person, one share." This is, obviously, not the way the present unfair, imposed
hodge-podge of partitions in South Africa has been adumbrated.
It should also be noted that we have, in passing, corrected wording of our initial
counsel for one possible highly suitable norm for a fair partition, to the scientifically more accurate terminology of "one person, one vote" or "one person, one
share."
Few individuals and far fewer societies appear to be in a firm historic or present
position to cast the first stone on issues of the defense of human rights. Naturally this
exempts no one from efforts to improve our own and everybody else's awareness,
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labor throughout the Republic to be utilized for the benefit of
white entrepreneurs in the neighboring richer white regions. 43
The laws apportioning educational opportunities 44 assure that
blacks do not generally become skilled or professionally qualified.
Private capital of white entrepreneurs has not been permitted to
be invested in Bantustans generally, purportedly to preserve their
racial inviolability. 45 This would also serve to keep them underdeveloped and to reinforce the need of the bulk of the black population to rely on earning a living in the surrounding richer and more
capital-endowed white areas.
As we have stressed elsewhere, some sort of mutually negotiated "fair shares" partition of South Africa, in order to achieve equitable, secure, mutually acceptable self-determination of the races
would seem to be permissible under international law. 46 There
have been several recent precedents of relatively stable partitions
(given the apparent political alternatives) along cultural, religious,
or racial lines. One example is India, where the typical results may
at best be two unloving neighbors, each capable of defending its
own survival within the political system, and therefore of defending
itself from total exploitation by the other. But in South Africa under the current regime, "[t]here is no real Separate Development,
only racial discrimination in an integrated economy," 47 and there is
also no fair-shares, mutually acceptable, potentially stable partition
in the offing. Furthermore, since analytically the initial position (in
this case the already-achieved unfair white-dominated division of
territory and assets) dominates the ultimate bargain (by determining the bargaining ranges), no such partition could normally
be expected from peaceful, "multinational" negotiations between
and the system's performances.
It does suggest however that a resolute probe for fundamental, root causes of so
prevalent a phenomenon as systematic discrimination on the basis of arbitrary, "irrelevant" criteria such as sex, race, or religion, is necessary as an essential prerequisite
to the next stage, a more creative approach to the generation and evaluation of
alternative strategies for achieving widespread, convincingly improved performance

in these highly supercharged, intensely political issues, at home, and perhaps, more
difficult yet, in the international system.
43. Mowle, supra note 38, at 949-51.

44. Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1953, 6 STAT. RP.

S. AFRICA 1031 (But-

terworth 1959) (effective Jan. 1, 1954).
45. C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, supra note 36, at 213.
46. R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 117-25.
47. C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, supra note 36, at 213; see H. ADAM, supra note 38,
at 37-52, 67-73.
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poor, weak, divided bantustans and the present white-dominated South African government.
As for the legal treatment and civil rights of South African citizens, all South Africans live under an iron rule, including a legal
system which authorizes government authorities to use numerous
banning orders with no recourse, 48 which permits imprisonment
for a half-year for anyone who might possibly be a "witness" in a
security case, 49 which vests near unlimited power in the government to ban organizations, to ban political activities by suspected
persons, to use six-month periods of solitary confinement to obtain
information, 50 and to resort to other extreme measures frequently
labeled cruel in Anglo-American tradition and inconsistent with the
maintenance of individual human dignity. 5 ' In addition, however,
the lives and opportunities as well as the civil rights of non-whites
are specifically far more constrained and demeaning than those of
whites. All details of the non-whites' lives are regulated: there are
restrictions on where they can live, what jobs they can legally
hold, how they can vote, if at all, who their political associates can
be, what land they can own, who they can marry, what schooling
they can have. 52 Any "privilege" allowing an exception can be
canceled at any time. Public facilities remain generally segregated,
as does education. The presence of non-whites in white areas has
to date been permanently "migratory." The African is in general
48. H. ADAM, supra note 38, at 54; Note, Continued Repression in South
Africa, 27 BULL. INT'L COMMISSION JUR. 28, 28-35 (1966).
49. Note, supra note 48, at 28-31.
50. H. ADAM, supra note 38, at 53-54; Note, supra note 48, at 29.
51. See A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 161-99 (1973); Note, supra note
48, at 28.
This is not to suggest that South Africa is unique. Similar conditions exist in
other countries. See R. PLENDER, THE UGANDAN CRISIS AND THE RIGHT OF EXPULSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-32 (1972); Aihe, Preventive Detention in
Nigeria, 9 REV. INT'L COMMISSION JUR. 68, 68-74 (1972); Note, Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland, 10 REV. INT'L COMMISSION JUR. 3, 3 (1973) (resumption of absolute
rule in Swaziland); The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa:
Maltreatment and Torture of Prisoners in South Africa, 27 U.N. Spec. Comm. on
Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/8770 (1972). For a recent review of conditions in Africa, see
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 24.
52. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act and the Bantu Labour Act of 1964 provide most of the controlling mechanisms. For discussions of these restrictions see A.
SACHS, supra note 51, at 165-66; Note, supra note 48, at 28; Mowle, supra note 38;
Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/949 (1967). On
conditions of non-whites in South Africa Prisons, see "Elements of Genocide" in
Southern Africa, OBJECTIVE: JUST., April/May/June 1971, at 31-34.
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forbidden to strike to improve his lot at work;53 while some daring
Africans have bent this rule slightly, 54 and while the rule has been
modestly relaxed, 55 there have been mass shootings by the police
in the course of labor disputes, with rewards for the police commanders. A dispute at the Western Deep Levels gold mine at
Carletonville in 1973 became a riot in which police shot and killed
many miners. 56 The police were totally exonerated by a magistrate
and, it was further reported, the police officer who directed the at57
tacks was promoted.
Even if the South African government's statements and the
facts of its legislation concerning apartheid as a system of separate
development are taken at face value, they constitute a system of
race relations constrained by a comprehensive set of coercively
imposed barriers to the personal freedom, personal development,
life chances, and well-being of the various non-white races. They
prohibit the equal competition of the non-white majority with the
white minority. They impose indefinite, irrevocable, economic, and
political subordination of the non-whites which can only facilitate
dependence, exploitation, deprivation, and the consequent brutalization of the lives of the vast majority of the population, based
solely on skin color: it is a "pigmentocracy." 58 Even with all the
projected Bantustans in full operation, the majority of non-whites
53.

A. SACHS, supra note 51, at 165.

54. In March 1973, for example, there was a large-scale strike of unskilled Africans demanding improved wages and work conditions in Durban. Several other
spontaneous strikes followed. There was another walkout of 10,000 workers in
Durban in Jan. 1974. Some 250 were arrested by the police. U.N. Press Release,
WS/643, Jan. 25, 1974, at 3.
55. Strikes are now permitted legally in "nonessential" employment, under certain conditions, and only after a long series of negotiations.
56. The South African government objected to any U.N. consideration on the
ground that this shooting was a purely domestic affair. The Special Committee on
Apartheid rejected this notion. Not only were alien miners involved, but it was noted
that the U.N. had repeatedly affirmed that apartheid policies were a matter of international concern. Killing of African Mine Workers at the Lorraine Gold Mine in
South Africa, Report of the Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, 29 U.N. Spec. Comm. on
Apartheid (Agenda Item 28), U.N. Doe. A19653, S/11328 (1974); U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Nov. 1973, at 82; U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Oct. 1973, at 29.
57. U.N. Press Release, WS/635, Nov. 30, 1973, at 8. The mine manager
reportedly testified that the police had provoked the African workers and had used
undue violence. U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec. 1973, at 37. On labor unrest generally, see G. CARTER, supra note 34, at 45-47.
58. C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, supra note 36, at 6; L. THOMPSON, POLITICS IN
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 150-51 (1966). As noted earlier, it is not only

"blacks" (Bantu) who are subjected to the special regimes but "coloured" (mulattoes), Indians, and Orientals as well. H. ADAM, supra note 47, at 39-43.
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would be obligated to work in low-prestige, unskilled, relatively
poorly paid jobs and to live much of their lives under a special regime, deprived of all potential opportunity, both to escape upward
economically or politically and to develop fully-their life chances
severely constrained "from the cradle to the grave" by the
dominating minority. They are, in effect, low-paid prisoners, deprived of most of their legal rights, allocated to and required to return regularly to their sparse prisons. 59 Their crime is being nonwhite. It is not the result of an act of choice. It is perpetual,
indelible, and hereditary. Nonetheless, the major question remains: taken at its worst, is apartheid now, as practiced in South
Africa, as part of its regular governance of domestic affairs, contrary
to present international law?
One approach to such a question is to explore some closely related objections most frequently offered to any assertion that
apartheid may already be illegal in general international and U.N.
law. 60 First, it is claimed that the treatment of a segment of a population, majority or minority, is still, in the view of all states, normally a domestic matter. Since Nuremberg, this is surely a difficult
claim to make unqualifiedly, yet it can be expected that no
controlling group in any state is normally willing to have its preferential biases, discriminatory practices, and the like aired and
judged internationally. And whose standards would be applied if
not those belonging to the majority or the "legitimate" decisionmakers?
All societies are in fact run by a relatively small percentage of
the population, which may variously be labeled as the "decisionmakers," or the "elite," or the "power majority." Of course crucial
differences exist in the "responsibility" these elites have to their
constituents and in the effectiveness of the controls achieved by
these constituents over the decisionmakers' performances. The
types of preferred treatment they extract for themselves, the scope
59. To pursue the metaphor, as in some Latin American countries, these "prisons" are "self-run," but life within them is kept within the real constraints ultimately
dictated by the jailers.
60. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, (entered into force July 18, 1976);
G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1973); see
[1973] U.N.Y.B. 97-105.
Obviously, for any nations ratifying the treaty on apartheid, apartheid, as defined in the treaty, is illegal. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3. The treaty is in force but
it seems certain that many states in addition to South Africa will not ratify any such
treaty. Hence, we must look to more generally accepted norms, if they exist.
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of the subgroups with privileged access to preferred treatment and
life chances within the society, and the scope and intensity of the
special barriers erected to other regularly excluded, nonprivileged
groups also seem likely to vary with this same set of political variables. But in all hierarchical political societies, there is a scarcity of
preferred life roles relative to candidates and preferred subgroups,
and disadvantaged subgroups tend to exist.61 How to separate and
61. See Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Achieving the Human Rights of Women: the
Base Line, the Challenge, the Search for a Strategy, 4 HuNUN RIGHTS 125 (1975). In
a study by Rita Taubenfeld, Overcoming Barriersto Equality: The Sexual Discrimination Case (forthcoming 1981), these issues are analyzed in greater depth. In that
study it is stressed that the distributive struggles that determine a persons' or groups'
achieved roles in a society are "typically characterized by (1) scarcity of the desired
payout; (2) indeterminacy; and hence (3) great distributional conflict" even among the
in-group members.
There is not much room at the top of a pyramid: by definition, there is much
less room at the top than anywhere else. Thus, in a hierarchically organized society
of multiple hierarchies more people will have to be privates than generals.
But when the distributive preferences of the actors run counter to this intrinsic
structure of opportunities for payout, we face an extremely "niggardly nature." It is
probably impossible to think of any cases in which in fact only one mortal could "fill
the bill" well. Indeed human survival would be biologically endangered if this were
the case. No one is uniquely qualified. Indeterminacy, more good candidates than
openings, can be viewed as a necessary biological strategy. Under these circumstances, it pays the powerful or best-placed social subgroups to invent all kinds of diversionary or discriminatory exclusionary strategies for eliminating large groups of
potential competitors for the scarce, desired social roles and life styles, and such
strategies are in fact regularly resorted to in most or all complex societies.
Both the existence of arbitrary, irrelevant, discriminatory qualifying criteria
(race, sex, religion, etc.) and, note also, the use of arbitrarydevices to correct these
biases coercively, if necessary (like quotas), on these assumptions need imply no
long-run efficiency loss. Every population can be assumed to have qualifiable talent
(too much). This is a continuous threat to the security of the tenure of all elites
which can be expected to attempt to protect their privileges, at least normally by all
legal devices they can devise for the purpose.
This designedly oversimplified set of statements is repeated here to suggest the
analytical essence of some of the basic causes for the worldwide incidence of discrimination and some reasons for believing it will not be totally eliminated at the domestic or international levels soon.
The underlying convenience of arbitrary discrimination to the decisionmakers of
most states and its institutionalization within the distributive machinery of most societies suggests that well-publicized, aggressively pursued corrective action backed ultimately by political coercion and constant vigilance are required. This only highlights the crucial importance for excluded groups to organize in order to garner and
assert political power both at the national and international levels if they wish to
greatly modify the traditional outcome of the distributive systems.
On quotas: Note also the by-now conventional acceptance of this arbitrary correction device in the international system. Obviously the use of quotas need not repress discriminatory conduct effectively. That depends on the "appropriateness" of
the criteria used as a basis for quotas. U.N. personnel-policy experience exemplifies
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to identify the internationally illegal discriminatory practices and
policies from all these others seems therefore to be at the same
time both difficult and conceptually crucial. An important related
issue is the claim that in a world where there are demonstrably
discriminatory policies and legal deprivations within member nations, based on ethnic origin, race, religion, sex, even ranging up
to, in some cases, slaughters based on tribe,62 the particular "aberration" of apartheid cannot be held illegal. In principle this argument rests upon the premise that apartheid ought not and should
not be condemned so long as so many other coercive, discriminatory activities are carried on by member states free from the scrutiny and comment of the U.N.
A third, frequently raised, closely interrelated objection to
claims that apartheid is currently illegal is based on the formal concept of domestic jurisdiction in international law. The demand that
a nation abandon a crucial national distributive policy and system
of extensive and far-reaching effects on all citizens' ways of life
within a sovereign nation, and that that nation dramatically revise
its constitution to accord with what world opinion defines as minimal racial justice is surely a revolutionary concept. It would no
doubt be resisted by all nations if it were applied to their own constitutions. Furthermore, any claim to the development, even incipiently, of binding powers of constitutional review by the international system, whether by the primitive international court system,
or by the very primitive international legislature, is likely to be
viewed as a major potential threat to the system of sovereign indethis nicely. The Secretary General has indeed predicted that the outlook for the
U.N.'s hiring more women, as has been urged, is poor. The under-represented geographical regions from which hiring will be stressed (despite all the Charter words
about the equal rights of men and women, and all the other relevant "equal rights of
women" documentation subsequently negotiated under U.N. aegis) do not normally
tend to send women. See Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra, at 133.
62. The world has been confronted, for example, by shocking accounts of mass
murders in Burundi where the dominant Tutsi, who number 15% of the population,
held near-total control over the Hutus, the remaining 85% of the people. Estimates
of the numbers massacred by the Tutsi to maintain their dominance range from
80,000 to 200,000. Hearings,supra note 9, at 53-54, 64-91, 974-81. African leaders of
other nations reportedly did not want to interfere in Burundi's "internal affairs" at
the time. Id. at 84; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1972, § 4, at 2, col. 4. Cambodian killings are
also reported to amount to perhaps a fourth of the population. To again proceed with
our own analysis, we would have difficulty excluding such cases as especially severe
crimes against international law. On their face, they appear to be identifiably extreme deprivations of human rights which are so severe that they should logically be
crimes on human rights grounds, and should elicit both international reaction in defense of human rights, and the personal culpability of the responsible officials.
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pendent states as enshrined in the U.N. Charter,6 3 and as such
likely to be treated warily by all. 64 This is the heart of the constitutional dilemma that the evolutionary development of binding human rights law in general has underlined for the present system.
This is why progress has been and can be expected to continue to
be slow.
To summarize the issue more generally, we assert that the
quest for international legal protection of human rights has evolved
into a process of attempting to make ever more explicit-and
hence more legally enforceable-an already broadly delineated set
of constitutional-type international guarantees to individuals and
groups against which their own government purportedly may not
legally transgress. Most frequently, as in South Africa, these tend
to involve valuable distributive issues of intense political interest to
all members of the individual society itself, and to involve competition among them for access to privileged roles and lifestyles. Furthermore, the stakes are likely to be of special concern to those
groups that form the effective, dominating coalition, the "power
majority" within each nation. These are the groups which tend to
run the country and can be expected to do so primarily to optimize
their own overall satisfactions. It is quite possible of course that
their satisfactions will include running what by their definition constitutes a good society.
It is just these groups, the major decisionmakers in each society, who will have very great incentives to defend the sovereign
rights of their states to exclusive domestic jurisdiction over all important, valuable, distributive issues. These include the right to exclude and exploit or at least to deny fully equal treatment to all
contenders for the best life chances, including all minorities and

63.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.

64. For a discussion of this constitutional dilemma which the development of a
binding human rights law poses to the present system, see R. TAUBENFELD & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 8; text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
The authors further suggest that:
[Ilt is the contest for ultimate governmental control. Historically, sovereignty has been the chosen champion. A general international organization
which could effectively and consistently impose a world consensus on human rights on a state would be far more like a federal government than any
sovereign has thus far been willing to contemplate. In short, forceful UN intervention against apartheid in South Africa could represent a momentous
and portentous, if small, break with international legal and organizational
traditions.
R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra, at 8.
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all suppressed majorities, who have not been admitted to the
dominating coalition.
Again we return to the question that, if this is not an atypical
form of political-sociological behavior, how can we claim that the
way chosen by South Africa, to wit, "apartheid," is, or is becoming, illegal in international law and is a "crime against humanity"?
Can we do so in such a way that the other states, each of whose
leaders can be expected to value their own privileged domestic jurisdiction, can be comfortable that the distinctions being made are
clear-cut, analytically and politically necessary, and rather unlikely
to boomerang on them? We think it can be done.
It can be seen that at least two relevant sets of constitutionalchoice issues exist:65 (1) the normative-distributive dilemmasbriefly, how should access to the limited "best places in the sun"
be shared out optimally among human members in the face of
inherent acute scarcity; and (2) the operational dilemmas-how to
develop people and/or design social-choice institutions which will
implement the distributive decisions optimally and address such
problems as keeping the elite effective yet honest and acquiescent
to the group norms and rules.
Although constitutional diversity on these crucial choices on
the basis of the sovereign's self-determination is the currently accepted strategy of the international community, we assert that (1)
some subsets of solutions to these ultimately domestic politicalconstitutional questions, those that we label identifiably extreme,
have become internationally unacceptable on human rights grounds;
that (2) in such extreme cases at least the basic human rights of
the endangered human groups are or should be superior to all
other competitive internal or international rights, except, of course,
similar survival rights of others; and therefore that (3) for reasons
65. A constitution need not, of course, be, and in the case of the international
community is not, written, at least not in any single instrument. Here, we are directly concerned with another kind of constitutional choice, theoretical constitutional
choice, a subject which already has a very long, distinguished intellectual history
stretching in the modern era at least from Rousseau to Rawls, and one that is still
unwinding. Consistent with contractarian traditions, we are thinking here of the constitutional choice by a "rational" community, composed of rational individuals,
negotiating an optimal-compromise "social contract," a bargain on the basic rules by
which society will be run, including, inter alia, therefore, the social choice of "fair"
distributive strategy and institutions and, more generally, the planned society's overall approach to the resolution in practice of all the conflicts implied in the intrinsic
dilemmas we have noted above, of coercive governments comprised of "sovereign"
individuals.
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to be explored below as applied to the case of apartheid, this
subset of identifiably extreme constitutional choices should be regarded as not merely illegal but internationally unconstitutional because they are crimes against humanity. Special international enforcement efforts would seem to be called for, and the personal
criminal responsibility of members of the domestic leadership
found guilty of perpetuating these crimes should eventually be anticipated. In brief, clearly unconstitutional regimes can be identified. That of South Africa, at present, is unconstitutional on human rights grounds.
Apartheid and U.N. Norm Setting
The United Nations has had a special interest in South Africa
from the first days of the organization's life. Beginning with an Indian complaint in 1946 concerning discriminatory measures employed in South Africa against people of Indian origin, 6.6 the General Assembly has adopted resolutions condemning South African
policies at almost every session through the 17th, when the issue
was merged into the question of apartheid. 67 South Africa claimed
that the matter could not even be discussed due to Article 2(7)'s
prohibitions.6 8 Other states insisted that fundamental violations of
the Charter could not be matters of domestic jurisdiction, 69 and
that "human rights were not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state." 70 Thus, the basic conceptual conflict between
these two very important accepted U.N. goals, or sets of constraints, emerged early and has remained a common theme of all
U.N. activities on apartheid.
Apartheid has been formally before the U.N. since 1952 when
the question of a race conflict in South Africa was considered by
66. See

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SYNOPSES

THE UNITED NATIONS CASES IN THE FIELD OF PEACE AND SECURITY 5

67.

OF

(1966).

5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 364-77 (1965); I REP-

ERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 126-29 (Supp. 2, 1964) (U.N.
CHARTER art. 1-8); I REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS 29-32

(Supp. 1, 1958) (U.N. CHARTER art. 1-54); I REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED
NATIONS ORGANS 67-75 (1955) (U.N. CHARTER art. 1-22). For an extended bibliogra-

phy on the racial situation in South Africa through 1972, see L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 1, at 735-39.

68. For the discussion and Field Marshal Smuts' statement, see U.N. General
Assembly 1st Sess. (50th mtg.) 50, 2 Plenary Materials, Dec. 7, 1946, at 1007-10.
69. Id. at 1015-19.
70. Id., (51st mtg.), Dec. 8, 1946, at 1026 (Panama); id., (50th mtg.), at 1019-20
(China).
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the General Assembly as a possible threat to international peace
and a violation of basic principles of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 7 1 Again, South Africa rested its case primarily on the
language of Article 2(7), contending that even discussion of the
matter was impermissible intervention in a domestic matter. South
Africa has uniformly insisted as well that its activities are no threat
to the peace (a situation in which Chapter VII admittedly overrides
Article 2(7)), but rather that, if anything threatens the peace, it is
72
the bellicose demands on South Africa of other African states.
This conflict in interpretation and legal-norm setting has continued to this day. Most states have argued that action of the General Assembly with respect to human rights is not an "intervention" within the meaning of Article 2(7) and that South Africa's
policies violate the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Hu73
man Rights, which have been said to ban racial discrimination.
The General Assembly has discussed and adopted resolutions on
South Africa's racial policies at every subsequent session. The Security Council has acted on occasion as well, although it never has
74
utilized the full range of power given it by the Charter.

On April 1, 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, 75 the Security Council recognized that the situation in South Africa had led to
international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security, and called for measures to bring about
equality and racial harmony. 7 6 Over time, the General Assembly
has recommended sanctions of varying degrees of severity: these
include nonrecognition and nonacceptance of credentials at the
U.N., economic sanctions, and arms embargoes. It has established
Committees to keep watch on apartheid developments and to ad-

71. See G.A. Res. 616A, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952). See generally CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, supra
note 66, at 27-28; 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 67, at 364-77.
72. For an earlier survey of South African reactions, see Index de Communica-

tions, Emanant D'Etats, Relatives A La Politique D'Apartheid Du Gouvernement De
La Republique Sud-Africaine, 26 U.N. Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.115/L.103 (1964).
73. See G.A. Res. 616A, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952); G.A. Res. 615, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
74. Note that Britain, the United States, and France are among South Africa's
principal trading partners and that South Africa is the largest single area of U.K.

overseas investment. It enjoys significant U.S. investment as well. Much of the nonSoviet world's supply of gold is produced in South Africa.

75. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1960, at 3, col. 3.
76.

S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR (856th mtg.) 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/4300 (1960).
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minister Namibia (South West Africa). 77 In addition in August,
1963, the Security Council called on states to cease the sale of

arms, munitions, and military vehicles to South Africa, 78 but sales
continued and South Africa built up a major domestic arms indus79
try; it is now, in fact, an arms exporter.
Some states, like France, have over the years opposed generally the interventionary aims of the U.N. 80 Others, while sup77. G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 9-10, U.N. Doe. A/5217
(1963); G.A. Res. 1663, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 10-11, U.N. Doe. A/5100
(1962); G.A. Res. 1598, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A) 5-6, U.N. Doe. A/4684/Add.
1 (1961). A special committee on apartheid was established by G.A. Res. 1761 on
Nov. 6, 1962; its work needs to be considered with that of the Special Committee on
Decolonization, established by G.A. Res. 2248, 5 (special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1)
1-2, U.N. Doe. A/6657 (1967), "[t]o administer South West Africa until independence." Id. at 1. Western powers have not served on the apartheid and Namibia
committees.
78. S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July, Aug., and Sept.) (1056th mtg.)
73, U.N. Doc. S/5386 (1963).
79. See G.A. Res. 2054, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 16-18, U.N. Doe. A/6014
(1965); S.C. Res., 18 U.N. SCOR (1078th mtg.) 103-05, U.N. Doe. S/5386 (1963); S.C.
Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR (July, Aug., and Sept.) (1056th mtg.) 73-74, U.N. Doe.
S/5386 (1963). For a discussion of events in 1965, see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Issues Before the 21st General Assembly, 559 INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION, Sept. 1966, at 113-19. For reports of U.N. appointed experts on the
vulnerability of South Africa to sanctions, see 20 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (No. 2) 1-8, U.N.
Doe. S/6210 (1965); 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June 1964) 249-51, U.N. Doe.
S/5773 (1964); 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (April-June 1964) 19-22, U.N. Doe. S/5658
(1963). For other studies on the potential efficacy of economic measures against
South Africa, see R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 79-114;
Hance, Efforts to Alter the Future: Economic Action, in APARTHEID AND UNITED
NATIONS COLLECTIVE MEASURES 95 (A. Leiss ed. 1965); Leiss, Efforts to Alter the
Future: Military Measures, in APARTHEID AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE
MEASURES, supra, at 131-53 (military sanctions); SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

62-233 (R. Segal ed. 1964) (dealing with legal aspects, strategic implications, trade,
petroleum, gold, impact on economy of U.K., and that of U.S., and High Commission
Territories); Gray, The Case Against Sanctions, ATLAS: WORLD PRESS IN TRANSLA-

TION, Jan. 1965, at 25-27; Legum & Sampson, The Case for Sanctions, ATLAS:
WORLD PRESS IN TRANSLATION, supra, at 22-25.

For the authors' general views on the lack of efficacy of economic measures
alone against a determined, prepared state which considers that its vital interests are
at stake, see Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, The "Economic Weapon": The League and
the United Nations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 183 (1964) (58th annual mtg.).
80. In August, 1963, France and the U.K. abstained on S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (July, Aug., and Sept.) (1056th mtg.) 73-74, U.N. Doe. S/5386 (1963),
calling for an arms embargo. France raised the domestic jurisprudence issue; the
U.K. stated that there was no threat to international peace. In December, 1963, however, both voted for S.C. Res. 182, 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct., Nov., and Dec.)
(1078th mtg.) 103-05, U.N. Doe. S/5471 (1963), a limited arms embargo on a "recommendation" basis, which was adopted unanimously. Both France and the U.K.
agreed to ban only arms for "internal repression."
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porting the ends, have objected to the somewhat precipitous ways

in which the General Assembly has acted.81 A few states have
urged repeatedly that "in terms of Article 2(7) of the Charter, the
United Nations is precluded from considering [the issue of
apartheid]"; 8 2 others that "no immediate threat of hostilities exists." 83 While many of the U.N. members have applied trading

sanctions, the major western powers have not generally limited
trade, except in arms, and some, in particular France, reportedly
84
continue to sell arms as well.
Over the years, General Assembly language has become in-

creasingly strong. In 1968, for example, the Assembly not only reiterated its views that apartheid was a crime against humanity, but

also asked the Security Council urgently to consider the use of
Chapter VII measures and condemned South Africa's trading partners for not enforcing economic measures, labeling apartheid as a

mass violation of human rights, a flagrant violation of human rights,
and a crime against humanity.85
In addition, in 1970, with France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States abstaining, the Council adopted a resolution
again condemning apartheid, calling the situation a "potential
threat to international peace and security," and calling upon all
81. For replies from governments, see Study on the Question of Implementation of Operative Paragraph 3 of G.A. Res. 2054A of 15 December 1965, Report of
the Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, 21 U.N. Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, U.N. Doe.
A/6356 (S/7387) (1966); Summary Record of the Seventieth Meeting, Report of
the Spec. Comm. on Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/AC.115/SR.70 (1966); U.N. Doe.
A/AC.115/SR.72 (1966), at 4; U.N. Doe. A/6226/Add.2 (1966), at 3. The Soviet Union
has accepted sanctions. See U.N. Press Release, WS/248, July 1, 1966, at 5.
82. The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South
Africa, 20 U.N. Spec. Political Comm., 2, U.N. Doc. A/SPC/107 (1965).
83. E.g., U.K. and U.S. For other responses to the embargo resolutions, see Secretariat summary in Summary of Communications from States on the Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Report of the Spec.
Comm. on Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/AC.115/L.143 (1965).
84. See The Observer, Oct. 18, 1970, at 11, col. 1 (French sales).
85. On apartheid as a "mass violation" of human rights, a "crime against humanity," and a "flagrant" violation of standards of human rights, see G.A. Res.
32/130, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 150-51, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res.
3411G, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 38-39, U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975); E.S.C. Res.
1869, 56 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 22-23 (1974). For earlier discussions and measures, see G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 19-21, U.N. Doe. A/7218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2307, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 19-20, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967); G.A. Res. 2202, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 20-21, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2054, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 16-18, U.N. Doe. A/6014
(1965). Economic sanctions were again urged by the General Assembly in 1969. See
G.A. Res. 2506B, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
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states to support an arms embargo. 86 The Council frequently condemned apartheid thereafter and, in 1977, on the basis that the
South African situation was indeed a danger to international peace

and security, the Security Council adopted a mandatory arms em87
bargo.
The General Assembly, in numerous resolutions, has called
apartheid a negation of the Charter of the United Nations and a
crime against humanity, and has called removal of persons to
Bantustans action akin to that condemned in the Nuremberg
principles-as affirmed at the U.N. and elsewhere-as constituting
"crimes against humanity" in that they involve "enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts . ..enforced against
[a] civilian
88
grounds."
religious
or
racial
political,
on
population
The Assembly has thus also indicated its lack of satisfaction
with the far broader Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination, promulgated by the General Assembly
in 1965 and in force in 1969.89 Since it is in force, and relevant,
we will briefly comment on the implications of this treaty for our
problem.
86. S.C. Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR (1549th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doe. S/INF/25
(1970); see 25 U.N: SCOR (1545th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/1545 (1970).
87. On requests by the General Assembly that the Security Council impose
mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, see G.A. Res. 32/105G, 32 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 35, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res. 3324D, 29 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 37-38, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). On the adoption by the Security Council of a mandatory embargo on all arms shipments and sales, on the basis
that the situation constitutes a danger to international peace and security, see S.C.
Res. 421, 32 U.N. SCOR (2052d mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res./421 (1977); S.C. Res. 418,
32 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/Res./418 (1977). A voluntary arms embargo had been recommended in 1963. See S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(July, Aug., and Sept.) (1056th mtg.) 73, U.N. Doc. S/5386 (1963). The General Assembly continued to insist that France, the U.K., and the United States were not, in
fact, fully complying. See G.A. Res. 32/105F, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 34-35,
U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
88. G.A. Res. 2775E, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 43, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); see G.A. Res. 32/105N, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 40, U.N. Doe. A/32/45
(1977) (U.N. condemnations of Bantustans); G.A. Res. 32/105K, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 45) 37-38, U.N. Doe. A/32/45 (1977); S.C. 417, 32 U.N. SCOR (2045th mtg.) 4-5,
U.N. Doc. S/Res./417 (1977); G.A. Res. 3411D, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 37,
U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975). For earlier, similar statements, see G.A. Res. 2775 A-H, 26
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 41-45, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2671F, 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 33-34, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The resolution was
adopted by 110 to 2 (Portugal, South Africa) with 2 abstentions (U.K., France). Representatives of several other states, had expressed reservations about reference in
these resolutions to the Charter and to Nuremberg. See U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE,
Dec. 1971, at 84-85.
89. 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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The Convention on Racial Discrimination is supportive of the
U.N. work to protect human rights described earlier. It provides,
inter alia, that States Parties shall "engage in no act or practice of
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions ....

"90

More specific guarantees-the right to take part in

government and public affairs at all levels, equal access to public
service, equal treatment before tribunals, protection against violence and willfully inflicted bodily harm, freedom of movement
within the state, the right of freedom of marriage and choice of
spouse, and the right of freedom of peaceful assembly-are found
in article 5. Many of these rights clearly do not exist for the majority of non-whites in South Africa. Article 3, for example, is directly
on point vis-a-vis South Africa: the States Parties "particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent,
prohibit and eradicate ...

all practice of this nature." 91 For parties

to the Convention, and to the extent that the Convention is accepted as indicative of existing international law, by international
standards as well, state-endorsed, or even state-tolerated racial discrimination in general, and apartheid in particular, are currently
deemed illegal. While special mechanisms are provided, the primary sanctions of the Convention remain publicity and world opinion. 92

Although Nuremberg seems to indicate that under international law illegality of a gross nature can lead to the criminal prosecution of officials who order and carry out the illegal acts, even in
the absence of specifically applicable treaties, the General Assembly has not been willing to allow this precedent to suffice in the
case of apartheid. Nor did it feel that mere illegality as under the
Convention on Discrimination sufficed. It has continued the pursuit of explicit specificity in building its political-legal case against
apartheid and its perpetrators as a particular example of an extreme
case of internationally illegal deprivation, and, indeed, as a human
rights "crime."
Thus, in 1973, as noted above, specific General Assembly at90. Id. at

218.

91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. Reservations are permitted to the Convention and a substantial number
have been made. Moreover, while a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is established to review state-reported compliance with the Convention,
and can receive complaints by individuals, it can receive such complaints only if
their State has recognized the competence of the Committee to do so, and few States
seem willing to do so.
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tacks on apartheid, as distinct from ordinary racial discrimination,
culminated in the promulgation of a Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 93 It was stated
that "apartheid constitutes a total negation of the purposes and
94
principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
In the Apartheid Convention, the General Assembly called
anew for the implementation of effective measures to suppress the
crime of apartheid. 95 The Convention defines the crime of
apartheid as constituting "inhuman acts committed for the purposes
of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group ...
over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them."9 6 Included as such "inhuman acts" are the infliction of serious bodily or mental harm, arbitrary arrest, the deliberate imposition of living conditions calculated to cause the
destruction of a racial group, and measures designed to prevent a
racial group from participating in the political, social, economic, or
cultural life of a country. 97 A ban on mixed marriages is specifically
mentioned as well; so too are expropriation of landed property belonging to members of a racial group, exploitation of labor, and
persecution because of opposition to apartheid. 98 International
criminal responsibility applies to those committing or directly
inciting such acts, and parties to the Convention undertake to suppress the crime of apartheid and punish those guilty of it. 99
The Convention does not itself bind a nonsignatory South
Africa, of course, and, since it remains unratified by many nations,
and by major powers, it cannot by itself soon be expected to form
the basis for either a treaty or a customary norm. Yet the expression of intent of the signatories is clear. And, as noted, the law of
human rights may well be expected to grow in response to discrete
policy jumps taken by a few (or, at times, even one) especially con93. G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973),
reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 50 (1974).

94. Id., reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 93, at 50. Showing
its further displeasure, the General Assembly, in 1974, refused to seat the South African delegation and moved to expel South Africa from the U.N. The Security Council
did not concur in expulsion, the United States, France, and the U.K. all casting negative votes.
95.

See id. at 75-77, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 93, at

50-57.
96. Id. at 75-76, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 93, at 52.
97. Id. at 76, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 93, at 53-55.

98. Id.
99. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 29, at 14;
see U.N. Press Release, WS/636, Dec. 7, 1973, at 3.
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cerned states. If the new norm being espoused appears ethically
compelling because its time has finally come, or for other reasons,
and is also backed by persistent, convincing political efforts by the
lead state(s), the laggards may indeed be expected to eventually acquiesce officially, particularly if they feel it politically useful or necessary for group safety. In a growing legal system where there are
lag and lead sectors and actors, the fact that there may well be uneven performance in practice for some time, or multiple standards
for states with different real capacities and incentives to conform,
cannot be viewed as particularly unusual or special to human rights
issues. It is indeed, a healthy sign of growth of legal and organizational capacity in this nonintegrated international system. 100
Nevertheless, it remains a problem for the signatories and for
the effective development of human rights that many or perhaps
most of those states appear to be currently in violation of one or
more of the Apartheid Convention's prohibitions. Indeed, this
highlights a basic difficulty with the overall approach to the control
of apartheid via legal innovation, as well as by continuous political
pressure in and outside the United Nations. Innovation in response
to genuine, complex, intransigent problems is not to be denigrated, but the fact is that many of the moves against South Africa,
including the Convention against Apartheid, appear to have been
designed to be applied only to this one widely disliked, highly offensive state (which has some powerful business connections).
Therefore there does not appear to have been a major effort to define an international set of generally applicable standards concerning which highly unacceptable illegal practices or conduct must inevitably be labeled as crimes against humanity. Nor does this
approach appear to have been in the nature of a quest for minimum human rights norms to which all signatories would be willing
to conform now or agree to be bound either immediately or even
eventually when they develop the mature capacity to conform to
agreed group standards. As such, the long campaign and the Convention do risk violating such other important basic concepts of
justice as equality, in principle, before the law. They may reasonably look capricious, unfair, and politically as well as legally
unworkable, and therefore a discrediting bad precedent. In sum,
although we have recognized specifically the frequent necessity for
"leading" sectors even in the law, it would be reasonable also to
100. R. Taubenfeld, The Control of Economic Conflict in the International System: Analysis and Case Study (1969) (Dissertation, U. of Calif. at Berkeley).
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look for some evidence of a genuine intention of some of the laggards to attempt to catch up eventually with the proposed standards, if only to preserve the long-run credibility and viability of the
legal system.
The upshot is that this highly specific condemnatory Convention appears an unnecessary negative path to take towards innovation intended to effectively increase the real content of human
rights protection of all peoples against governments. For understandable but dubious reasons, it deliberately passes over the hard,
fundamental conceptual and constitutional dilemmas inherent in
doing so and the resultant increased necessity for strong, legal protections for both minorities and majorities, at all levels of government, including the international level. There have been many
warnings over the years from the United States and other governments that the U.N., to be viable, also should avoid a "tyranny of
the majority." Therefore, a basic document interpreting the scope
of "crimes against humanity," which has to be a very important international constitutional concept, should be drawn only subsequent to a full-scale, sophisticated, constitutional exploration of
these dilemmas, the conceptual and international compromises
they necessitate, and the risks we are all taking however we choose
to design our contemporary social contract. Presumably it should
not primarily evolve as the embodiment of a not very careful effort
to single out one or two especially unpopular criminal states.
It is also fair to add an additional challenge before returning to
the case. If it appears generally agreed by the states that the present felt need in a world where nuclear weapons are available to
many states is an international system allowing both the continuation of largely sovereign, self-defending governments and the
growth of specified, credibly defensible minimal human rights, it
would surely behoove the governments of the major Western powers, which were the principle critics of the Apartheid Convention
on grounds of workable "justice," to come forth with their own
more positive proposals taking some small steps, especially in cases
of extreme depredations, in the direction of safe progress towards a
more workable international constitutional regime for the effective
defense of human rights now. In principle it is not impossible to
combine this with the maintenance of credible security for the reasonable needs for independence of the nations from dangerously
encroaching external legal-enforcement processes. The will to take
this step has clearly been lacking.
In any case, the major thrust of a new convention against the
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whole class of grave delinquencies, crimes against humanity-of
which apartheid remains a prime example-should be aimed at
clearly establishing the existence of limits of destructiv6 treatment
of peoples, including discriminatory conduct, beyond which all sovereigns, in principle, could not legally go. The norm itself, then,
would be generally applicable. It should no doubt be designed to
operate ultimately on some rule of reason, interpreting and applying the general guidelines included. The resultant regime might
be expected to recognize, inter alia, that, although all societies run
by humans can be expected to practice some arbitrary, de facto
discriminations, and the control of these undesirable phenomena is
traditionally within domestic jurisdiction and will remain there,
there is nonetheless a limit beyond which states cannot legally go
in imposing draconically discriminatory treatment on internal populations on the basis of arbitrary criteria, without generating international concern and, eventually, enforcement activities. Furthermore, it would be important that it be generally understood that
this is in the nature of a constitutional rule, and that states are obligated to assure that their effective, legitimate power majorities do
not cross this constitutional bar to undertake measures of massive
exploitation or policies that irreversibly degrade by coercion their
power minorities. It must be understood that there is, after all, an
international "Bill of Minimum Rights" of individuals and subgroups, no less defensible because it is partly unwritten. It would
appear that it would then be easy to demonstrate that a program
like apartheid in South Africa-a planned, comprehensive, coercively imposed, exploitative campaign by a government entrapping
a population subgroup permanently in degrading conditions from
which it has no genuine exit-which would not be illegal under the
laws of that society is identifiably beyond the line drawn by the international community; that is, that a regime which amounts to
an appropriation of the subgroup's birthrights, depriving it of not
just one or two important rights but of all of the civil, economic,
political, psychological, and personal human rights and aspirations
enjoyed by other subgroups in the population is both repugnant
and criminally illegal.
Such a new convention might also include a list of carefully
drawn per se offenses reminiscent of those in the present Convention. For example, one could argue that, in explicitly imposing, on
the arbitrary basis of race, a militarily policed, second-class lifetime
plan which offers no exit except by death or by secession on grossly
confiscatory terms tantamount to expulsion with expropriation,
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apartheid is clearly and identifiably equatable with genocide, so
inhuman, entrapping, and dehumanizing, and therefore so inevitably dangerous to the peace as to be illegal per se. It could then
reasonably be listed as a rather more specified member of the illegal set of crimes against humanity. No one claims that such a convention would be simple to obtain or to apply at the international
level, and there appear to be no simple routes to the fair, effective
growth of protection for human rights. Yet, the interests at stake
call out for a full-fledged attempt at protecting human rights within
the world legal order.
It is true that even the present Convention might, if widely
accepted, achieve the status of those anti-war and related treaties
which were taken at Nuremberg as showing knowledge of intolerable wrongdoing and of international lawbreaking by Nazi leaders,
who were indeed held individually responsible for their acts. It
might prepare the ground for a more general, fairer, safer, more
conceptually sound approach to the development of the legal category of crimes against humanity which no government of humans
can expect to transgress indefinitely with impunity.
THE CURRENT STATUS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, apartheid has been termed odious, intolerable, a pathological aberration and, in recent years, in a formal manner, a crime against humanity.' 0 ' It has been urged in the U.N.
that it be treated as a cruel, inhuman disease which must not be
permitted to affect other areas. It has been described, in language
appropriate to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as "a threat to in10 2
ternational peace.'
We return then to our earlier questions: Can emotional and
essentially political overtones be separated out so that a reasonably
intelligent, objective judge could determine that there is today a
set of acts or government programs which constitutes an identifi101. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 27, 1966, § 1, at 16, col. 4 (remarks of President
Lyndon Johnson).
102. "The United Nations has recognized that the perpetration of [colonialism,
racial discrimination, and apartheid], particularly in their gravest manifestations in
Southern Africa, constitutes a great danger to international peace." U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/1209 P1/84 Feb. 17, 1970, at 2 (statement by U.N. Secretary General U
Thant). Prof. Van Dyke has argued that: "If the principles and the reasoning applied
to Southern Rhodesia justify a finding that it constitutes a threat to the peace, it is a
very short step to the conclusion that South Africa does too." V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 214 (1970).
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able, internationally illegal set of comprehensive, coercive, discriminatory activities into which category the South African system of
apartheid fits? If so, how can it be judicially identified as being different from other commonly or universally used methods of affording different population subgroups unequal opportunity, which
remain presumably either legal or arguably illegal but not amounting to crimes against humanity. And, finally, in which instances
is it likely to be elevated to the level of an overriding norm, presumptively superior even to the conflicting Charter-approved norm
that no state and no international organization may intrude on the
historically sanctified right of the sovereign state to pursue its own
domestic policies, including its distributive policies, free of all outside interferences?
We have already suggested our answer to these crucial questions and our approach to establishing workable, legal criteria for
significant crimes against humanity. Concern for human rights, as
indicated in the Charter, has been slowly spreading since World
War II. It is still a tender flower, but there are by now enough
treaties, enough practice, enough concern voiced by national
spokesmen, enough expansion of Charter terms by definition,
enough creation of a constitutional limit on states, to permit argument that at least some of a population subgroup's minimal human
rights to survival are presently and legally enforceable even against
sovereigns under some specifiable, reasonably clear-cut circumstances. These delicts, which are labeled crimes against humanity,
are indeed readily identifiable, ex post at least, in part because
they tend to be extreme measures of such an obvious, comprehensive, flagrant, and irreversible nature as to engage the conscience
of humanity. They therefore also promise to threaten the peace
sooner or later. In the interim, they tend to promote international
tensions and crises which accompany the efforts of especially affected nations-those with special affinity to the endangered population groups-to create the political will in international forums to
achieve enforcement of basic justice against such crimes against humanity. Apartheid in South Africa, as practiced to date, appears to
be such a case.
It is true and to be expected that such a complex of extreme
deprivatory practices may already be illegal, even when perpetrated by a sovereign despite the fact less pervasive but commonly
practiced discriminatory domestic practices are not yet internationally illegal and, indeed, may never be expected to be so. Workable
standards for defining this extreme class of offensive policies do ex-
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ist and are evolving. Scholars and nations should explicitly explore
the appropriate legal approach to such crimes against humanity but
even without such scrutiny it is already possible to assert that
states and judges could apply existent and emergent international
normative standards reasonably, objectively, fairly, and equitably
so that predictable, generally applicable, norms and outcomes
would result, even if some would escape the net. Clear-cut crimes
against humanity are not impossible to identify even on the basis of
past international practice.
Finally, even if it is likely that the international system cannot
soon be expected to cope fairly and well with the most widespread
types of domestic discriminatory conduct of the numerous states (for
03
example, with generally practiced discrimination against women),'
it is nonetheless neither illogical nor legally improper that the
states, or the U.N., persist in efforts to obtain at least minimum
justice, the survival of subgroups, and to assure peace and security
where offenses are most clear-cut and comprehensive-most exploitative, long-standing, irreversible, inhuman, and dehumanizingand where internationalpolitical consensus in favor of effective enforcement has been actively pursued and widely attained. Indeed, for the states or the U.N. to ignore such a course could in
the long run be dangerous to the peace. In addition, failure to cope
with deficiencies of this type is likely to compromise respect for, and
hence the future viability of, current international institutions
themselves. Similarly, the fact that, even in the case of clearly defined international legal norms and decisions, enforcement and
compliance are often imperfect in the international system would
not normally alter the illegality of the conduct involved. These are,
indeed, all too common failings of international law; they do not affect the juridical determination of present illegality. Lapses in compliance do, of course, highlight the longstanding need for systemic
reform and for improved performance by the nations. Nevertheless,
imperfect performance and de facto multiple standards of achieved
justice exist within all legal systems; this has never been taken as an
excuse for instituting anarchy or jungle law. One last important consideration needs iteration here: a legal system cannot indefinitely
continue to respond negatively to demands for minimal justice,
even if these entail new risks.
103. See H.

TAUBENFELD & R. TAUBENFELD, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION:
ORGANIZATION (Vol. I, 1978; Vol. II, 1979); Tauben-

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

feld & Taubenfeld, supra note 61.
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When it is even riskier for members of a court or the overwhelming majority of states not to permit the organs of the international system to exercise new or newly effective powers than it is
for them to do so, survival logic calls for such an exercise of powers
to be viewed as legally and politically permissible. Presumably the
organized, developing international system also has some right of
self-defense in extremis, even if that requires growth which some
may quite reasonably regret or dread. At the very least, if the
court or organization does allow itself to choose to fail, possibly, in
its view, for the good of all, it would seem that the constitutional
and other normative dilemmas on which its stewards have chosen
to allow it to founder should be thoroughly explored by them for
the education of their ultimate replacements. A legal system and
an administrative system have to be able to change and, if necessary, grow to their tasks; at least they ought to be allowed to fail
creatively, and without, hopefully, bringing the peace down with
the failure.
Some Possible Elements of an OperationalCriterion:
Offenses Against Humanity in Human Rights Law
Without attempting to cope with the inevitably difficult range
of questions involving borderline cases in which discriminatory distributive social systems or institutions are just barely intolerable
and dehumanizing enough to be verging on the criminally illegal,
we have drawn together a not necessarily complete list of the few
readily identifiable extreme classes of comprehensively exploitative
and coercively dehumanizing domestic distributive policy complexes which are now or soon promise to be illegal under international law. Among the extreme offenses readily classed as crimes
against humanity and treated as currently illegal there are two
clear-cut cases-slavery' 0 4 and genocide. In addition, the exercise
of colonial domination over a country whose people are normally of
different ethnic stock, while not presumably a crime against humanity, is equally clearly not now politically acceptable. It has
been a repeated source of danger to peace and security. It can be
104.

Here we mean slavery in the strict sense in which human beings are re-

garded as property, as assets to be bought and sold rather than as individuals with

"inalienable" human and legal rights. For a recent interesting case of near-classical
slavery in the United States, see U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.214111Add. 1 (July 4, 1978)

(re charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546, 1584 (1976), Involuntary Servitude and Slavery). For other materials on slavery in the 1970's, see U.N., Reports of the Working
Group on Slavery, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/389 (Aug. 30, 1977).
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counted on to lead to civil and international disturbances. Indeed it
is now likely that new attempts to establish such a formal colonial
sovereignty would be treated by many as illegal internationally.
Historically, in the typical colonial case, an indigenous population
was explicitly dominated by a foreign government, often via a small
resident foreign minority which organized the local distributive system of the colony so as to exploit the potentials of the territory's
resource base as far as possible, principally for the suzerain's de
facto benefit. There are surely strong parallels between the effects
of this now unacceptable regime and the current South African regime. Apartheid, which has been described and defined in some, if
not all, of its complexity above, shares important motivational and
other features with each of these other currently legally or politically unacceptable institutions and, indeed, by extension, could be
and has been viewed as illegal as well as politically unacceptable on
those grounds alone.
Once again, although slavery is formally illegal so that in principle a person cannot legally be the property of another, conditions
which are almost indistinguishable from, or close substitutes for, illegal slavery are normally not criminal in international law. Note, for
example, the impaired status and the genuinely limited legal rights
and opportunities of married women in many nations.105 Similarly in
the case of apartheid, there are various less pervasive, less irreversible, less comprehensive, less draconic, less insurmountable, less offensive economic-deprivation and legal-exclusionary strategies which
probably do significantly and systematically compromise the life
chances of nonfavored groups of citizens automatically, often on the
basis of arbitrary, irrelevant criteria, over which the parties have no
choice, such as race, sex, religion, tribe, color. These are regularly
used by all nations precisely because they tend to yield outcomes favorable to the privileged group similar to those achieved by the organized, legal type of racial enslavement which is labeled apartheid
in South Africa. Yet, there is a clear-cut difference between an intent to advantage one's own group and disadvantage or discriminate
against all others, and a conscious, deliberate, comprehensive, irreversible, lifelong, coercively enforced legal, political, economic, and
social program designed to achieve lifelong racial exclusion and subjugation and economic exploitation or racial expulsion. That difference is even now identifiable with some discipline and some legal
predictability. Indeed there is a very important difference between
105.

Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 61, at 153-55.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9.:475

any subgroup's being systematically disadvantaged and being officially barred permanently from the social competitions for the desirable life roles as in apartheid.
In conclusion, the package of extreme exclusionary practices
known as apartheid in South Africa is so offensive to internationally
shared common norms of decency, and so deliberately, incompensably damaging to the victims thereof, and to their sense of
their own human dignity, that it both should be, and probably is,
not merely illegal in international law, but by now constitutes a
crime against humanity. Unfortunately, as in other cases, enforcement may not be possible except post bellum. 10 6
Of course, the tenor of this argument includes the possibility
that, in years to come, the line of unreasonable, illegal conduct for
sovereigns will shift so that some of the present commonly practiced offenses perpetrated by sovereigns against their various population subgroups will also become enforceably illegal in international law. In time, the effective protection of human rights will
grow, and the category of crimes against humanity will be cautiously but more liberally construed as well. For the present, we
have to start slowly and carefully and to expect to rely primarily on
achieving no more compliance than can be induced from the domestic institutions of the law-breaking state itself, augmented by
international pressure. In terms of constitutional choices, major interferences with sanctified domestic jurisdiction will be restricted
to the already really clear-cut cases of currently abhorrent crimes
against humanity: slavery, genocide, and apartheid.
106. For South Africa proper, we note again that there have been, in 1980, official statements appearing to portend a change in at least the most drastic parts of the
apartheid program. See note 55 supra. On the current U.S. attitude with respect to
South Africa and change, see BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SOUTH AFRICA: U.S. PoLicy, APRIL 30, 1980 (Current Policy No. 175, May 1980).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/8

40

